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Abstract
The previous paper provided the general approach to Frameworks of research and research
methods to study accounting changes in Galician healthcare [Purdy DE, Gago S. Towards a frame-
work to study inﬂuence and accounting use. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 2003;14:663–78].
Consideration of the Galician legal and institutional materials provided the details and indicated
the need for further analysis. This paper analyses Galician materials and the Spanish notion of
retos, considers autonomy in the context of inﬂuence and changing information provision. Conse-
quently, the Information–Inﬂuence Matrix is revised as are those anticipated for a Financial Manager
and a Health Centre Manager. Further Frameworks now consider the organization and institution
effects.
Work elsewhere has indicated that the promotion of more involvement by employees and the
provision of more information to employees has been accompanied by strong narratives favouring
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1such changes. Generally such change has been more favourable for managers than non-management
employees.
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1. Background
The interaction of individuals and ﬁnancial management data is a subject of current
interesttoaccountingandorganizationresearch.Theauthorslearnedofimpendingchanges
in Galician Health Centres and considered that this occasion was an opportunity to add to
ourknowledgeaboutpeopleandaccountingdata.Apreviouspapersetout,ingeneralterms,
theauthors’Frameworksofresearch,ortheoreticalperspectives,andsomeoftheirresearch
methods. The conclusion noted that the Frameworks could be used to evaluate ﬁeldwork
(Purdy and Gago, 2003).
After completing the previous paper we studied the details of the Galician legal and
institutional materials about the proposed healthcare management changes. Some further
matters emerged. Although the Initial Framework was soundly speciﬁed in general terms,
these further matters indicated a need to enhance the Initial Framework and amend it to be
as speciﬁc about the legal position with our anticipations, as we could before we analysed
our empirical observations. This has resulted in this paper which deals with the anticipated
Legal Institutional Context to a Framework of Issues for both the Health Centre Manager
and the Upper Manager.
We also noted that the proposed changes in Galician healthcare would affect the organi-
zational/institutional arrangements, consequently, the theoretical approaches of the Frame-
worksthatassistwiththeinterpretationofindividuals,havebeenre-interpreted/re-assigned
for use as Frameworks for the interpretation of organizational arrangements.
This paper discusses the development of these Frameworks and a more speciﬁcally
related set of ideas with which to handle our analysis of the Galician interviews. The intro-
duction very brieﬂy summarises the previous literature with the empirical and theoretical
development of the area, then the earlier paper’s Information–Inﬂuence Matrix and the
speciﬁcation of the Initial Framework (Purdy and Gago, 2003).
Section 3, the Galician Context, contains explanations about the legal matters and is
followed by a section with our observations on these. The relevant parts of these legal
mattersweretranslatedanddiscussedinEnglish.Inparticularwere-considerourideasabout
inﬂuence, with the introduction of autonomy and then the changing nature of information
mentionedinthelegislation.Intheﬁfthsection,wecriticallyevaluatetheunderlyingnorms
which we had adopted towards the legislation and introduce some literature of similar
changes elsewhere.
The sixth section sets out the Implications for the Framework and developing
our Framework, individually, for both managers. There are revisions to the initial
Information–Information Matrix, Personal Matrix and also the Frameworks of Issues for
thePersonalInformationInﬂuenceMatrixchangesanticipatedforaFinancialManagerand
2then a Health Centre Manager. The seventh section produces an Organization Information
Inﬂuence Matrix for Health Centres and from this a Framework of Organization Issues for
the Health Centres. A brief summary and conclusions completes the paper. Consistent with
our writing practice, we use the male form in this paper, simply because males were in the




employees and appreciations of the different contexts that have fostered its provision and
use by employees. These social constructions of organizational activities led to other social
constructions of employee involvement as forms of inﬂuence, an Information–Inﬂuence
Matrix, and the appropriateness of organizational arrangements. These interests developed
to seek understanding at the level of the individuals involved using personal construct
psychology (Kelly, 1955) and then into personal Frameworks of the individual and the
organizational as perceived by an individual (Purdy, 1993).
ThepreviouspaperandearlierversionsusedtheInformation–InﬂuenceMatrixtodemon-
strate how the anticipated general changes in Galician healthcare might be handled by
individuals. The changes indicated that a Health Centre Manager would be employed to
run the Health Centre. Previously, a Health Centre had been administered by an Upper
Manager so we anticipated that the Upper Manager would be involved helping the Health
CentreManagerintothenewsituation.Thepaperdemonstratedhowchangesintheindivid-
ual managers might occur and it used the Information–Inﬂuence Matrix as a means through
which to show and understand the changes (Purdy and Gago, 2003).
The components of the Matrix are constructs of information and inﬂuence relating to
an employee and a manager. Each construct has four areas deﬁned. With inﬂuence are the
markers of No Inﬂuence, Communication, Consultation and Participation.
No Inﬂuence is the position where the employee is not allowed to exercise any inﬂuence
in the organization in the formal sense, or perceives no obvious inﬂuence in the situation.
An employee could inﬂuence matters by leaving the organization for example.
Communication is a position where the manager tells the employee about a decision
already taken, for example, by the manager. The employee might have the opportunity to
formally express an opinion about the decision, but cannot directly inﬂuence the situation
because the decision was already taken.
Consultation is the position where the manager provides information to the employee
about a situation, and the employee has an opportunity to express an opinion to the man-
ager before the manager takes the decision. Here the employee could affect the manager’s
decision because of the discussion.
Participation is the position where the employee receives information about a situation
and discusses this with the manager before they jointly take a decision, or take it in some
manner which they jointly agreed previously. The employee has the most opportunity to
inﬂuence a situation, and for participation to happen, the manager and employee have to
interact. Any information can come from either person.
3Participation requires the employee to be an effective and active person capable of learn-
ing, as well as providing ideas and information. Information, inﬂuence and interaction all
appear to be necessary for participation to be in a state to occur (Purdy and Gago, 2003).
Wall and Lischeron (1977) devised and tested their notion of decision distance in their
work on participation. Employees in a participative situation had notions about the relative
distance of decision-making from them. The closest distance decisions were “Local”, such
astheemployee’simmediatejobdecisions.Otherdecisionscouldbeata“Medium”distance
from the employee and perhaps concern a department. The furthest decisions were called
“Distant”, and could concern decisions about the whole organization.
To conceptualise information, Purdy adapted the decision distance types of Wall and
Lischeron (1977). Again there are four markers for each area, which are: No Information,
Local Information, Medium Information and Distant Information.
No Information is the position where the employee perceives that no information is
received or provided.
Local Information is that information which exists for the current and immediate job
at hand. It is a local decision for the employee and likely to be the smallest quantity of
information.
Medium Information is information for decisions further than the immediate job or the
initial work activity. Decisions are taken at a medium distance from the employee and this
information is likely to be more complex than local information.
Distant Information is any information used for decisions beyond medium decisions.
Such decisions are taken at the furthest distance from the employee and probably use the
most complex of information from any part of the organization.
2.2. The Information–Inﬂuence Matrix
The constructs of Information and Inﬂuence have been construed for use with an
employee. Purdy considered that the constructs of Inﬂuence and Information were used
at the same time, when an employee made decisions. To show this he used a Matrix as a
method of representation and brought in the two constructs, each with the four areas and
fourmarkersdeﬁningthese.ThisistheInformation–InﬂuenceMatrix.Afterascertainingthe
employee’s arrangements for inﬂuence and information, Purdy indicated that, these details
could be used by a researcher to determine the position of an employee on the Matrix in
relation to information and inﬂuence. In this way it is possible to study the position and
movement of an employee on the Matrix, which should be able to deal with any situation.
Fig. 1 is a representation of the Information–Inﬂuence Matrix for a hypothetical
employee. Each person and context is anticipated to be different and each will act dif-
ferently. The boxes for the same position of inﬂuence contain the same words, as these are
only an indication of the employee’s action.
We used the Information–Inﬂuence Matrix to anticipate what would happen, in general,
with an Upper Manager and a Health Centre Manager. We also explained the history of
our approach to research using Frameworks in job situations (Purdy and Gago, 2003). We
accepted that organizations have differences in accounting systems, decision-making and
change(PurdyandGago,2003)andthenotionsofGeorgeKellyaboutpersonalconstruction
(Kelly, 1955). Personal construction had been used to demonstrate the differences in ability
4Fig. 1. An Information–Inﬂuence Matrix.
ofmanagersononecommitteetounderstandaccountingdata.PurdyhadusedaFramework
of Eight Issues, that he anticipated an individual Ward Unit Manager might possess, as the
theoretical approach to his longitudinal study in a UK teaching hospital (Purdy, 1993).
In Purdy and Gago (2002), this Framework was subsequently revised, simpliﬁed and
re-considered in a Spanish context to be used with research conversations with Business
School managers. The work corroborated the useful and sensitive nature of the Original
Framework and the dynamic nature of such Frameworks.
These methodological approaches using Frameworks and Matrices were adopted in the
previous paper (Purdy and Gago, 2003). In that paper it was understood that the general
nature of changes would be as follows. An Upper Manager and a Health Centre Manager
would be involved in management changes at a Health Centre. The relevant general aspects
5Fig. 2. Line represents anticipations about changes in the Health Centre Manager’s position on the Matrix.
were that the Health Centre Manager would gradually take over the ﬁnancial management
and this aspect of control of a Health Centre from an Upper Manager who was currently
doing that job.
2.3. Speciﬁcation of Initial Frameworks
The personal Matrices were anticipated to change. The changes for the Health Centre
Manager were anticipated and a line representing these anticipated changes is in diagram
form in Fig. 2.
TheseanticipationswerealsoconstructedasaFrameworkofIssuesfortheHealthCentre
Manager on a Personal Matrix as follows:
61. Starts in the No Information–No Inﬂuence box.
2. After a short period of time will interact with the Upper Manager and so will then be
located in the Local Information–Communication box.
3. AfterafurtherperiodofinteractionwillbelocatedintheLocalInformation–Consultation
box.
4. After a further period of interaction will be located in the Local Information–Sole Par-
ticipation box.
Also, a Framework of Issues on a Personal Matrix for the Upper Manager was also con-
structed as follows:
1. Starts in the Local Information–Sole Participation box.
2. After a short period of time will interact with the Health Centre Manager and so will
then be located in the Local Information–Consultation box.
3. After a further period of interaction will be located in the Local Information–
Communication box.
4. After a further period of interaction will be located in the Local Information–Different
Information box.
These Initial Frameworks are re-considered after a more detailed analysis of our under-
standingsaboutlikelyactivityinGalicia.ThenextsectionexplainstheGalicianbackground
in terms of legal matters and healthcare expectations.
3. Galician Context
3.1. Legal matters
Since 1978, the Spanish Constitution has recognised and guaranteed the right of auton-
omytoSpanishnationalitiesandregions(Constituci´ onEspa˜ nola,1978,p.2).Spainiscom-
posed of seventeen autonomous communities, two departmental communities (Balearics
and Canary Islands) and two autonomous cities (Ceuta and Melilla).
The autonomous communities may assume responsibility for and control of healthcare
(Constituci´ onEspa˜ nola,1978,p.148).TheGovernmentexertscontroloverallhealthcarein
Spain. It determines the basis and general co-ordination of healthcare, regulates medicines
throughstatutes,andpassesbasiclegislationdealingwithhealthcareanditsfundingthrough
the system of Social Security (Constituci´ on Espa˜ nola, 1978, p. 149). The Government can
delegate its responsibilities and control to any of the autonomous regions (Constituci´ on
Espa˜ nola, 1978, p. 150).
Since1981theSpanishGovernmenthasdecentralisedawiderangeofhealthcarematters
to Galicia, one of its autonomous regions. The Galician Government has the right to deter-
mine many aspects of healthcare. It can organise and administer its own healthcare and to
legislate for these (Article 33 of the Ley Org´ anica, 1/1981). However, it cannot legislate for
theﬁnancingofhealthcareasfundscomefromtheSpanishGovernment.Fig.3liststhemain
relevant legal and institutional changes about Galician healthcare between 1978 and 1998.
The Galician Health Service (SERGAS) was created in 1989 to improve and achieve a
higher level of health amongst Galicians (Ley, 1/1989). Primary healthcare is the ﬁrst level.
7Fig. 3. Main legal and institutional changes relating to Galician healthcare (1978–1998).
It is based upon the traditional trust between doctor and patient. Primary healthcare, being
the prevention of illness, individual and group health education, social work in the health
area and any other community groups concerned with health matters, will generally be
based upon a Health Centre. Various laws have contributed to the modernisation of primary
healthcare in Galicia. These aim to achieve a level of primary healthcare, which fulﬁls not
only health criteria (high quality, respect for the patient, etc.) but also management criteria.
In1993theDecree(Decreto,200/1993)forthemodernisationofprimaryhealthcarewas
issued, indicating substantial changes for healthcare, its organization, the use of resources
anditsdevelopment.Theintendedchangesweretheoutcomeofastudyandconsensuswith
theterritorialcorporationswhohadtoparticipateintheformulationofhealthpolicyaccord-
ing to Spanish law. Territorial corporations include representatives from trade unions and
business’ associations. This process must maintain the required representative proportions
as guaranteed by Spanish law (Ley Org´ anica, 11/1985, p. III; Ley, 14/1986,p .5 ) .
The 1993 Decree required not only high quality healthcare but also the need for easy
access to a Primary Healthcare Unit, i.e. a Health Centre. Health Centres were required to
be suitably located and to function with appropriate demographic ratios and types of care.
The Decree expected unity to be promoted among the different healthcare professionals.
Each Health Centre was free to provide a variety of advertised services, although there was
a minimum group of activities common to all centres.
The Primary Healthcare System and Health Centre were expected to facilitate the real
and effective participation of the immediate community so as to achieve the objectives of
primary healthcare given by law (Decreto, 200/1993).
All primary healthcare was to be promoted within a system of participative management
based on the objectives set and evaluated by the results attained. The 1993 Decree did not
mentiondeﬁniteoutcomesorkeyperformanceindicators.Itmadeadeclarationofintentions
about healthcare, but was conscious that the reform would require a certain amount of time
and economic support, both of which were not available currently.
8This modernisation was expected to promote a climate in which professionals not only
had a suitable environment and adequate conditions for developing their tasks, but also
had incentives for remunerating those people who worked more, better, and were able to
assume different “retos”. Retos is a Spanish word without a direct English equivalent, and
is explained further in the main section Observations on Galician Background (see p. 11).
The law stated that information management systems would capture information about
individuals and the deﬁnite objectives that they achieved successfully in a period of time.
Theindividualsweretoberewardedwithaproductivitybonusfortheiradditionaleffortto
achieve continuous improvement. The development of a suitable management information
system capable of producing information about individuals and their objectives was also
expected to occur (Decreto, 200/1993).
The Decree’s other objectives were the introduction of a health identity card, and the
introduction of changes to the remuneration system, which took into account the number of
patients and their characteristics—age, dispersion, etc. It was anticipated that there would
be enough physical, human and permanent training resources available for these activities.
The Health Centre would be staffed with medical, nursing, non-healthcare and general
service people. The working day would take into consideration the healthcare needs of the
professionals involved, and a reasonable distribution of resources and workloads (Decreto,
200/1993).
Theprofessionalswouldhaveasuitableenvironmentandtheopportunitytochangetheir
roles. Professionals would keep up-to-date with their knowledge. The Centre would have
adequate technical support for health education, promotion and assistance, all set in the
community and supported by legal and administrative functions (Decreto, 200/1993).
In 1995, the upper management of Galician primary healthcare was organised into ﬁve
areas: A Coru˜ na-Ferrol, Santiago de Compostela, Lugo, Ourense and Pontevedra-Vigo.
Cities are grouped according to geographical and population criteria (Decreto, 252/1994;
Orden 11 Mayo, 1995). The rest of this section of the paper relates to this Decreto and
Orden unless shown otherwise.
These documents noted that an Upper Senior Manager was responsible for each area.
He guaranteed the adequate development of the services in the area, as well as managing,
co-ordinating, supervising and evaluating the activities. The Upper Senior Manager was
responsible for adopting measures to achieve the Galician Government’s objectives and
for the other proposals aimed at achieving these objectives. Also, he managed human and
economic resources, set out details of the proposed annual expenditures, produced periodic
reports and an annual report about activities. Finally, he produced and submitted data about
healthcare management to the Galician Government.
Directly responsible to the Upper Senior Manager were two individuals, a Health Man-
ager and a Financial Manager. Our simpliﬁed notions about these managers and their
relationships to a Health Centre Manager are shown in Fig. 4. This structure means a
separation of the medical and administrative functions.
TheHealthManagerwasresponsibleformanaging,co-ordinating,supervisingandeval-
uating the services of primary healthcare and the management of its implementation. He
collaborated with the development of the services offered by the Health Centre and eval-
uated the quality of healthcare. He also took the position of the Upper Senior Manager in
case of that manager’s illness, absence, etc., and for the delegated functions speciﬁed by
9Fig. 4. Generalized management structure to a Health Centre Manager.
law. Subordinate to the Health Manager was a Medical Manager and a Nursing Manager,
who were responsible for the management, co-ordination and supervision of the medical
and nursing activities and for the delegated functions. These three managers are not a part
of our research.
The Financial Manager was responsible for managing, co-ordinating and supervising
the economic-administrative activity. He also provided administrative-technical support
to other managerial levels and managed human resources. The Financial Manager gave
technical-administrative support for producing the annual proposed expenditures, managed
generally, co-ordinated, supervised and evaluated the areas that supported the healthcare
activity,suchasmaintenance,cleaning,security,etc.HereplacedtheUpperSeniorManager
in case of illness, absence, etc., when the Health Manager was not available to act for the
UpperSeniorManager,andforthedelegatednon-healthcarefunctions.Hehadsubordinates
such as an Assistant Financial Manager.
ThefunctionsofalltheselevelsofmanagementinthePrimaryHealthcareServicewereto
provide,developandevaluateprimaryhealthcare.Thisincludedtheestablishmentofannual
objectives. The Head of the Primary Healthcare Service was responsible for co-ordinating
the work of the Health Centres.
A 1996 Decree modiﬁed aspects of the 1993 Decree (Decreto, 161/1996). It offered
existing personnel the opportunity to join the new system. In the new system, people would
not earn less than before, but any promotion would not carry an increase in salary until that
point when pay in the new system exceeded the old. There were provisions for doctors who
did not want to enter the new system (Decreto, 226/1996).
AnationallawregulatedtheremunerationofthoseemployedinPrimaryHealthcare(Real
Decreto Ley, 3/1987). Thus, changes to the remuneration system took into consideration
thetypesofpeopletreatedandthehealthcharacteristicsoftheCentre’spopulation,sothese
factors had a more direct impact upon remuneration (Decreto, 226/1996).
In 1998, the system for offering primary healthcare was set out (Decreto, 352/1998).
It proposed working through a Health Centre established in each municipality. A Health
10Centre Manager would be responsible for the Health Centre’s functioning and organization
to the Head of the Primary Healthcare Service. The Health Centre Manager was expected
to allocate tasks and responsibilities, plan and run the service, and some of these would be
full-time administrators (Decreto, 352/1998).
4. Observations on the Galician Context
4.1. General
These observations about the Galician legal context are the matters we consider impor-
tant in relation to our empirical work and its analysis. Spanish healthcare was organized on
a national basis so some healthcare policies and all funding came from the national gov-
ernment, consequently, Galician healthcare was related to these policies and the national
funds provided. The Galician managers had responsibility and control of healthcare at the
operational level but had to work with the national position, and any policy changes. In this
paper we concentrate on the relationship between a Health Centre Manager and a Financial
Manager.
The legislation indicated that there was to be a high level of healthcare based upon




were involved in a sensible way with policy matters, any perceived inadequacies could be
possible sources of problems for the Financial Manager and Health Centre Manager.
The legislation indicated that the minimum levels of healthcare were expected to con-
tinue, even though modernisation was expected to occur without the necessary time and
necessary money required. The working day needed to consider the health professionals
with a reasonable workload and adequate technical support.
This modernisation was expected to provide primary healthcare in a suitable environ-
ment,togetherwithadequateconditionsandincentivestoremuneratepeoplewhowereable
to assume different retos. Retos is without direct translation into English, and appears to
be more than a challenge. It is when a person struggles to achieve something, recognises
the difﬁculties of trying to achieve this and learns from the experience. Retos contains the
notion that in carrying out the actions towards its achievement there is self-improvement
for the person.
Our interpretation of Retos for this context is as follows. Retos relates to an area of
activity where the area’s objective is difﬁcult to develop or carry out. For these reasons the
retos constitutes a stimulus for the people who are trying to work in that area. A Retos is
somewhat intangible and a qualitative developmental aspect of life.
The law stated that future information management systems would capture information
about individuals and the deﬁnite objectives that they achieved (successfully) in a period
of time. Also, individuals would be rewarded with a productivity bonus for their additional
effort to achieve continuous improvements. It was not clear how the objectives would be
determined and implemented, especially when a retos was an area that was difﬁcult to be
11precise about. These matters were likely to be problematic with the individuals involved in
the changes.
In our view a similar problem could occur with the reforms which remunerated those in
primary care in line with the population they cared for. For example, although an individual
may not lose any remuneration when moving to another job as a part of the reforms, there
was also no possibility that the individual’s remuneration could move beyond the new
remuneration structure set out by Spanish law. Consequently, under these conditions an
individual would not be able to increase the amount of their remuneration even though they
took part in the reforms, or achieved a deﬁnite objective, or were promoted.
InlinewiththeGalicianexpectations,itwasanticipatedthattoaidchangeinanyofthese
areas, people would receive various forms of assistance such as counselling and training.
Our anticipations about the effects of the possible changes for a Financial Manager and a
Health Centre Manager are next.
4.2. Financial Manager
The material above indicates that a Financial Manager had a wide range of duties and
responsibilities including producing the annual proposed expenditures and general support
of healthcare activities. It indicated that this manager’s inﬂuence over a Health Centre’s
affairs was quite considerable. This could continue even after a Health Centre Manager had
been put in place and was running the Health Centre.
On the appointment of a Health Centre Manager, one objective would be that in time he
would take full responsibility for the Health Centre, in place of the Financial Manager. As
the Health Centre Manager took responsibility so the Financial Manager would no longer
have sole responsibility and would move to a position of less inﬂuence over the Health
Centre at a daily level.
In the current position at the start, the Financial Manager would appear to have sole
responsibility for the Health Centre receiving all information about it and taking all the
decisions about daily activities. In this way the Financial Manager appears to act with
autonomy about daily activities. Over time this autonomy over decisions passes to the
Health Centre Manager. One reason for using the word autonomy is because Galicia is an
Autonomous Regional Government of Spain. Also, the healthcare reforms of the Galician
legislation suggest forms of autonomy. In this way the type of inﬂuence that the Financial
Manager had is anticipated to change from daily running responsibility to some other
responsibility, such as longer term plans about the Health Centre.
It was anticipated that the Health Centre Manager would take responsibility gradually,
and at the same time he was anticipated to be a source of information for the Financial
Manager. For example, if the responsibility for dressings had moved to the Health Centre
Manager the Financial Manager might now only be interested in total costs and usage. We
can anticipate that there will be this type of “Health Centre Manager local information”
created by the Health Centre Manager but we cannot make any anticipations about how
this is regarded by the Financial Manager. It seems like Local information for the Financial
Manager.
The notion of participative management was not deﬁned by the legislation. We consider
it to be a notion that we anticipate to vary with each Financial Manager and each Health
12Centre Manager. The ways in which participative management is interpreted and handled
by the Financial Manager and the ways in which it is interpreted and handled by the Health
Centre Manager might not be similar and might cause problems.
Another area where there could be difﬁculties is with retos. We anticipate the Financial
Manager to be responsible for the introduction of any number of retos with a Health Centre
Manager, and, as indicated above, these might not be easy to devise and implement. This
Financial Manager also appears to be responsible for the management system that produces
information about the retos. We also note that the Financial Manager might have retos too.
4.3. Health Centre Manager
With the proposed changes the Health Centre Manager would become responsible for
the functioning and organization of the Health Centre, and presumably the prime person
entrusted with the development of the Health Centre within its community. Depending
uponthepreviousfunctioningoftheHealthCentre,thesejobscouldrangefrombeingquite
straightforward to quite complex.
An individual taking up the position of a Health Centre Manager would need to be
content to carry out the particular jobs that the Financial Manager wants done. Also, the
establishment of the jobs could be a part of the participative management and subject
to negotiation. Clearly the previous work background and training of the Health Centre
Manager will be relevant to how matters develop. The issues of remuneration and the ways
inwhichvariousretosaredevisedandimplementedcouldbelargeconcernsforthepotential
Health Centre Manager.
Amongst other things, we anticipate the Health Centre Manager will be involved with
the acquisition of knowledge about the Health Centre and its ﬁnancial affairs. Assuming
that the person starts with limited knowledge about the Health Centre’s affairs, including
the ﬁnancial aspects, it is anticipated that any Health Centre Manager in this position will
learn these. This learning could occur in the course of the work at the Health Centre and
with the Financial Manager’s assistance. There could be other types of training.
AstheHealthCentreManagerlearnssohewillstarttoexerciseinﬂuenceovertheHealth
Centre’saffairs,andshouldtakeincreasingamountsofresponsibilityfortheHealthCentre.
In this way the Health Centre Manager will become more independent about running the
HealthCentre,untilhehastheresponsibilitytodothisessentiallyonhisown.Weanticipate
that the Health Centre Manager will take over the autonomous decisions previously made
by the Financial Manager and will achieve autonomy with the Health Centre.
As the Health Centre Manager becomes autonomous we anticipate that he will create
suitableinformationforareporttotheFinancialManager.Thisinformationwillrelatetothe
Health Centre and it is anticipated to be Local information for the Health Centre Manager.
4.3.1. Some UK evidence
The Galician proposals for greater participation and information provision in the man-
agement of health centres may be very different to previous Galician ideas, but there had
been somewhat familiar, if not similar, UK discussions in the 1970s and 1980s.
Thenationalpoliticalcontextwasthattherehadbeenindustrialunrestinthe1970s.Some
trade unions had claimed that companies could afford more pay for their employees and
13had used the company’s annual accounts as one basis for the argument. In return companies
claimed they could not afford more pay, indicated low company proﬁts and there was a
general move from more companies to make a copy of their annual report available to their
employees.ConservativeandLabourgovernmentswantedtomaketothesereportsformally
available to employees.
Labour governments went further and proposed giving employees the same legal rights
to receive a copy of the annual report as shareholders (Department of Trade, 1977a). There
were also proposals for employee representatives to sit on the company boards of directors
(Department of Trade, 1977b) and therefore it was considered that these reports should be
seen as a part of a move for employees to enter into the running of companies and the wider
concerns of industrial democracy (The Prime Minister, 1978).
The Labour governments encouraged industrial democracy by suggesting union repre-
sentatives should experience life at the board of directors’ level of the nationalised steel
company in the early 1970s (Brannen et al., 1976) and the Post Ofﬁce in 1978 (Batstone et
al., 1983). These experiences stopped in both areas, but these movements had undoubtedly
inﬂuenced the general UK climate about information provision and employee involvement,
as well as the production of an Employee Report (Purdy, 1988).
There were a few contemporary UK studies which related to the provision of accounting
information. Here some studies concerned with management accounting information and
or management information in more general are examined. The Tavistock Institute’s Cen-
tre for Decision-Making Studies conducted 36 in-depth interviews with key people, who
had particular knowledge of company affairs such as managers, supervisors and employee
representatives, in four banks/insurance and six metal manufacturing companies. These
interviews covered the reasons for and the extent of information provision to employees




or constraints on information provision. The results indicated that management controlled
the information provision process from the outset. Companies were more responsive to
providing information about matters of recent legislative interest, such as health and safety
and pensions. In all of these companies the least used form of information ﬂow to the
shop-ﬂoor employees was through the immediate supervisors (Centre for Decision-Making
Studies, 1979). It was later observed that these ﬁndings indicated an absence of processes
which might have fostered employee involvement (Purdy, 1988).
A notion of employee involvement was crucial to Goodlad’s project to assess, if it would
be viable to develop and monitor budgets from co-operation between management and
non-management employees, and, if this co-operation contributed to improved industrial
relations. Goodlad’s (1984) view was that information provision to employees could only
be meaningful in partnership with managers, employees and shareholders, and, that the
management accountant should serve all three.
Goodlad’s study was to involve six major UK companies, who had agreed to work with
him and provide case materials. He started initial work, progressed only a little further
and the study was not completed. He found no company had non-management employee
involvement in budgets, only one had considered it, and thought that senior management
14was concerned with its own self-protection (Goodlad, 1984). It was noted that Goodlad had
created interest in his ideas amongst his professional management accounting colleagues at
lowerandmiddle-managementlevels,abouthisnotiontoinvolvenon-managementemploy-
eesinbudgeting,butseniormanagementhadpreventedthisfromhappeningandsoretained
its power over a company’s future (Purdy, 1988).
A study by Marsh and Hussey involved the use of completed questionnaires from 236
companies. One hundred and ninety nine (84%) companies considered their principal rea-
son for providing an Employee Report was to involve their employees in company affairs
(Marsh and Hussey, 1979). As their analysis was deﬁcient Reeves classiﬁed their results to
obtain clariﬁcation (Reeves, 1980). Unfortunately, he still failed to demonstrate how this
provision of an Employee Report in isolation would bring about the stated aim of employee
involvement (Purdy, 1988).
In a study of the reporting practices of some of the largest UK public companies in the
late 1970s, Purdy interviewed the directors and senior managers. He wanted to identify
(a) why these companies had provided their employees with ﬁnancial information,
(b) the means through which each company achieved this provision,
(c) the degree of information provision (or disclosure) to which each company was com-
mitted.
The responses enabled the company management to be classed as either “traditional” or
“non-traditional” reporters of ﬁnancial information to employees. The traditional reporting
companies had an “open” management style of ﬁnancial information provision to employ-
ees.These“open”companiesalsohadthehighestdegreeofunionisationwiththepossibility
thatthepresenceassociatedwiththeunionshadrelatedtothis“open”style.Theopeninfor-
mation companies had operational structures such as works councils and brieﬁng groups
where managers and employees met and exchanged views and information. The open com-
panies primarily provided operational information through the management structure. The
Employee Reports had emerged on the initiative of management and were not a response
to requests for them (Purdy, 1988).
The “non-open” companies had the lowest levels of unionisation and a general absence
of systems through which management were aware of employee’s views. These companies
were trying to foster the notion to employees that they were open in their approach to
informationprovision,theiremployeesweretreatedfairlyandsohadproducedanEmployee
Report to show this (Purdy, 1988).
These two styles indicated different degrees of management provision (or disclosure)
of ﬁnancial information. In open management companies, the employees received verbal
operational ﬁnancial information and notionally could request and receive any piecemeal
information, as well as receiving an Employee Report. In the non-open management com-
panies the employees only received an Employee Report they did not receive operational
information nor could ask for piecemeal information. The interviewees from both styles




agement chose to refuse to provide piecemeal information requested by employees. The
15review of previous research in this area concluded that management had used accounting
data to sustain its power position. Further, there were inadequate conceptualisations of
research in this area. Currently, senior management controlled the context, the content and
the boundaries of ﬁnancial information. There was a need to consider ﬁnancial informa-
tion simultaneously with notions of inﬂuence and power. There was a need for a research
approach that recognised a continuum of accounting information rather than a considera-
tion of discrete amounts of information. The provision of ﬁnancial information needed to
be appropriate for each situation and to consider how the information is received by the
employee (Purdy, 1988). The conceptualisation of the Information–Inﬂuence Matrix was
one response to such matters.
4.3.2. General European Economic Community views on information provision and
employee involvement
The national political UK events about employee information provision and employee
involvement were paralleled in some ways with various activities in the European Eco-
nomic Community. Not all of the Commission’s materials are included or discussed here
becausethisisbackgroundmaterial.Itshouldbenoted,however,thattherewerediscussions
nationally in the UK governments about these proposals, but it was not until the Labour
government of 1997, that a UK government then ratiﬁed in December 1997 what had pre-
viously been accepted by all of the other members of the Community, including Spain. The
founding document (Treaty of Rome 1957) of the Community in Article 118b noted its
Commission shall endeavour to develop a dialogue between management and labour at the
European level which could, if both sides considered it desirable, lead to relations based on
agreement (European Economic Community, 1987).
The Commission, then, had been studying such matters since 1957 and had made unsuc-
cessful proposals about information provision to employees and employee participation
and consultation. The ﬁrst draft was issued in 1975 (European Communities Commission,
1975), it was revised in 1980 (when it was known as the Vredling Directive). The draft was
expectedtoapplytotransnationalcompanieswithmorethan1000employeesandproposed
three main rights for employees.
(a) Annual information from the parent undertaking about employment showing parent
and subsidiaries.
(b) Details about the parent’s proposals liable to have serious consequences for employees
in subsidiaries being expansions or contractions.
(c) Consultationoveranysuchproposalsandtodelaythematleast30daysaftertheopening
of consultation (European Communities Commission, 1980).
InMay1989,thesematterswerere-formulatedintheCommission’sCommunityCharter
of Fundamental Social Rights (referred to as the Social Charter), and accepted in Decem-
ber 1989. There were 12 sections including one, “Right to information, consultation and
participation of workers”, noting that the provision of information, consultation and partic-
ipation for employees shall be developed in a manner appropriate for laws, practices and
contractual agreements in member states. These rights were to cover technological changes
bankruptcies,redundanciesmergers,restructuringandanymajorchangeswithimplications
for employees’ employment (European Communities Commission, 1989).
16In September 1994, the European Works Council Directive was issued. Its objective
was to improve the rights of employees to information and consultation in organizations
with more than 1000 employees. Organizations had to establish either a works council
or a procedure for informing and consulting employees. Consultation was the exchange
of views between employees’ representatives and central/appropriate management. The
information component covered the organization’s structure, economic/ﬁnancial situation,
probable development of business, production and sales, employment situation and trends,
investment, any substantial changes concerning the organization including new work meth-
ods (European Communities Commission, 1994). In March 2002, the Commission issued
a Directive to cover all other organizations to consult and inform their employees. This
could take different types of forum to the works council, such as directly with employees
or indirectly through their representatives. Those with more than 150 employees had to
commence a forum from April 2005, whilst the smallest with more than 50 employees will
start after April 2008 (European Communities Commission, 2002).
It is of note that the sporadic references in Commission documents to the notion of
participation by employees and directly introduced by the Social Charter in May 1989 had
formally disappeared by September 1994.
4.3.3. Some US evidence
We have selected some of the US literature in the accounting area. Dewhirst considered
communication channel utilization and indicated that interpersonal channels involved a
“psychological cost” for individuals who were not used to sharing information. In a study
of engineers and scientists he found that the most appropriate communication channels
were inﬂuenced by an individual’s perceptions of the organization’s information-sharing
norms. He found, however, that the norms of the management in the work division of an
individual could affect the perceptions of that individual. In divisions with the norm of
using interpersonal channels of communication were perceived, the more the interpersonal
channels were used and the less use was made of the written channels (Dewhirst, 1971).
A study of the boundary role person considered his inﬂuence and potential ability to
inﬂuence decisions of other organization members. The boundary role person inﬂuenced
the organization’s members through his expert power and was able to channel and control
information-sharing into the organization (Spekman, 1979).
In a study which considered management teams and their performance measures to
improve the organization’s response, Scott and Teissen found that successful teams were
the ones whose members had the suitable abilities, were empowered and had adequate
information, and were rewarded for their performance. The team’s performance was pos-
itively associated with the variety of measures used and the performance increased when
members took part in setting the performance target. Team performance increased in teams
where there was greater weight given to their compensation. Teams performed better when
members participated in setting the measurement targets and received more compensation
(Scott and Tiessen, 1999).
Parker and Kyj examined vertical information sharing between managers and supervi-
sorsinthebudgetprocess,withresponsesfrom70peopleinUSmanufacturing.Theyfound
vertical information-sharing important to understanding budget participation and organi-
zational commitment. Information sharing occurred after organizational commitment and
17budget participation were in place, whilst the organizational commitment and budget par-
ticipation were affected by role ambiguity. Job performance, organizational commitment
and information haring were linked (Parker and Kyj, 2006).
The most relevant US study here was Arnold’s critique of 3 US companies’ new man-
ufacturing and accounting regimes using some labour movement debates of the 1980s and
1990s. By the late 1980s, the three companies had adopted employee participation pro-
grammes which seemed textbook models of employee involvement. In the 1990s, however,
the companies had bitter labour disputes. In one company the unionists were disillusioned
with the “empowerment” rhetoric, when they found the reality was outsourcing, downsiz-
ing and concessions on job conditions. Trust was destroyed and made worse when people
were locked out or replaced. Those who embraced union/management co-operation were
scepticalofparticipationprogrammes,teamsandqualitycircles. Arnold(1999)thoughtthe
employee participation schemes were to the same end as scientiﬁc management practices,
namely to control labour with standards.
At a second company the work was intensiﬁed. Some employees had more responsibil-
ities without pay. Some had less autonomy over their work and some had more autonomy,
but for those with more autonomy it was short-lived. There were a variety of explanations
about the demise of autonomy. Some thought it had gone because the management had
changed.Somethoughtthatifthemanagement’sfutureunionnegotiationswereunsuccess-
ful,thenthemanagementwouldbeunabletocopeinanautonomoussituation.Somefeltthat
management had been insincere and had used employee involvement to appropriate their
knowledge and weaken the unions. Management had presented employee involvement and
co-operation as a universal truth and excluded other views from discussion. Arnold (1999)
concluded that the employee involvement had not provided the promised empowerment,
job security and workplace autonomy, but it had provided the opposite with intensiﬁed
Taylorism, job reductions and permanent replacements.
4.3.4. Summary
The evidence from studies from the UK, the European Community and the US suggest
that moves towards the notions of employee involvement and information provision are
presented in very positive and strong ways, and accompanied by assurances of a more
fruitful or creative future for those involved. This seems to work at a management level
in the UK and US, but not at the lower levels of employees with autonomy and employee
involvement. In the European Community the elusive notion of employee participation was
held out, only to be removed for employees.
5. Critical comments on the Galician Context and similar changes elsewhere
The previous section clariﬁed the Galician legal context then indicated that this paper
would accept these notions at face value and these notions are implemented in the next
main section. Before dealing with these implications, it is appropriate to explain the bases
ofwhywehaveacceptedtheselegalproposalsforchangeatfacevalueandwhichnormswe
consider underlie our acceptance. We then introduce some previous literatures to provide
some evidence of changes which are in a similar area, from elsewhere. These suggest
18that the Galician changes will not occur smoothly. A second sub-section contains a brief
critical commentary containing previous research and reviews from the UK. A third deals
with European Community proposals for informing and involving employees. The fourth
presents some materials from the U.S. literature.
5.1. Underlying norms
At the start of this research we sought the help of the Galician Health Service and
were given access to a ﬁnancial manager who was expected to follow and implement these
GalicianlawsinaccordancewiththeHealthService’snorms.Thisﬁnancialmanageragreed
toprovideempiricalmaterialsabouttheprogressofchange,aswellasaccesstosomeofthe
clinicians involved. At the initial meeting with the ﬁnancial manager he indicated clearly
the importance of the Galician-inspired changes that he could bring to Galician healthcare.
He was very enthusiastic about his work, the imminent changes and clearly considered the
whole prospects for the Galician region in a very positive way and its healthcare proposals
a Galician initiative. We chose to accept his optimistic view about change without evidence
to the contrary.
The authors have different nationalities and experiences which did not lead to a straight-
forward acceptance about adopting this position. The Galician identity is strong with a
language more in common with Portuguese than Spanish as well as newspapers, books and
TV, all of which are widely accepted throughout Galicia. Having agreed our position, how-
ever, it meant that we had adopted the badges of a Galician identity attached to those laws.
The section on the Galician context showed that Galicia had been recognised as a separate
Spanishregionandidentitywiththeopportunitytotakeresponsibilityandcontrolofhealth-
care since 1978 (Constituci´ on Espa˜ nola, 1978, p. 149). In 1981, the Spanish Government
decentralised to the Galician Government the right to organize, administer and legislate for
these matters (Article 33, Ley Org´ anica, 1/1981). The Galician Government, however, was
never provided with the power to legislate to collect ﬁnance for Galician healthcare, and
the Spanish Government continuously determined the general co-ordination of healthcare
in Spain.
The Galician Health Service had been created in 1989 and various Galician laws since
had highlighted the need for primary healthcare based on health centres. The 1993 Galician
Decree stated the need for the modernisation of primary healthcare with suitably located
health centres providing a range of facilities in conjunction with the real and effective par-
ticipation of the immediate community. The healthcare provision was to be made available
through a system of participative management based on the objectives set and evaluated by
results, however, both the time and the funds for this were currently not available (Decreto,
200/1993).
Without repetition of all previous materials, these laws were proposals consistent with
notions of Galicianization and localization of the improved provision of healthcare. These
Galician laws indicated reforms speciﬁcally for the Galician region. This promoted an
acceptance and an afﬁnity to these proposals which allowed the ﬁnancial manager and the
authors to adopt this acceptance.
These laws were statements about anticipated and desirable healthcare norms in Galicia
atsomefuturepoint,astheyacceptedtherewerenoresourcesoftimeandmoney.Thiscould
19be a characteristic of Galicia, as it was once considered an independent set of people on
one northern border of Spain that was not easily accessible from Madrid and other Spanish
cities.
The Galician laws did not state particular outcomes or indicators for the work. It did
expect the health professionals to work in suitable conditions for the development of their
work, with appropriate remuneration incentives for those who worked more, worked better
andassumeddifferent“retos”.Therewouldbeproductivitybonusesfortheadditionaleffort
of continuous improvement (Decreto, 200/1993).
In1996,theexistinghealthcentrestaffwereofferedanewsystemwheredoctorscouldnot
earnlessthanbefore,buttheycouldonlyacquireasalaryincreaseifonthenewsystemsalary
exceeded the old. A new remuneration system incorporated the characteristics of the health
centrepopulationandthetypesofpeopletreated.(Decreto,226/1996).Theremunerationof
those employed in primary healthcare was nationally regulated (Real Decreto Ley, 3/1987).
Again the laws outlined desirable working conditions for the staff, but a local remuner-
ation policy for the doctors seemed an impossibility because their remuneration was and is
set nationally and, therefore, it is difﬁcult to conceive of changes about remuneration.
WasitpossiblethatthereferencetoretoswasaSpanishnarrativethatattemptedtoappeal
to the doctors to change their work routines without payment? We have interpreted retos as
an activity area where the object is difﬁcult to develop or achieve. It is also a stimulus for
people trying to work in an area, and, it is also an intangible and qualitative developmental
aspect of life. It might be that the law has offered the doctors personal development instead
of resources and remuneration.
The notions of autonomy in the context of all Spanish regions, including Galicia, has
been important from the start of modern Government in Spain.
Autonomy occurs for any individual as a personal response at the national and regional
levels,aswellastheorganizationallevel.TherehasbeenthedesireforautonomyinSpanish
life so that the idea of autonomous health centres would be appealing. The inter-connection
between regionally based Galician laws, the notion of local identity formed with Galicia,
the ability to take part and participate in affairs all imply some personal freedom, and this
is reinforced with notions of freedom covered by autonomy.
These all amount to the potential health centre manager being placed in a position of
autonomy,deﬁnedasapartofjoint-decisiontakingandthensoledecisiontaking.Theunder-
lying norms identiﬁed are a part of the overall narrative about regional freedom in Spain,
and portrayed in Galician laws. These and other narratives about Galicia have produced
personal constructs in the authors and the ﬁnancial manager about the Galician identity and
wanting the changes in the Galicia region to succeed.
6. Implications for the Framework for individuals
We have selected some of these more detailed materials relating to the possible individ-
uals involved, which might be relevant to our research. The legislation has stated only in
general terms the need for a Health Centre Manager and that this person will work with
the Financial Manager in running the Health Centre. Legislation has not indicated speciﬁc
issues beyond this or how the changes towards the participative management of Health
20Centres were to occur. We anticipate that the Galician Health Service might provide advice
and suggest how change is to occur, or it might be left to the Financial Manager to arrange,
or be a combination of both.
ThepapernowconsidersinﬂuenceandinformationinrelationtotheFrameworkofIssues
onaPersonalInformationInﬂuenceMatrixfortheFinancialManagerandtheHealthCentre
Manager. Inﬂuence is dealt with ﬁrst.
6.1. Inﬂuence
WhenPurdyconsideredinﬂuenceasaconstruct/notionofNoInﬂuencetoTotalInﬂuence,
he chose not to use Total Inﬂuence as a marker in the Information–Inﬂuence Matrix. If the
Financial Manager is responsible for the Health Centre, does this imply that he has Total
Inﬂuence over the Health Centre and that the Health Centre Manager will eventually also
have this?
Total Inﬂuence does not seem an appropriate inﬂuence marker to use after the legal and
institutional changes. Total inﬂuence by one manager does not seem to apply to Galician
healthcare where it seems that matters are discussed before decisions are taken by the
managers. Further, we have no knowledge of people who claim to have Total Inﬂuence
over matters in a participative system. We started with the construct No Inﬂuence to Sole
Participation in the Initial Frameworks.
The Information–Inﬂuence Matrix has an inﬂuence construct marker of Participation,
where two people can bring forward information before they jointly make a decision. This
considerationofParticipationdealswithanemployeeandamanager,butheretheseinterac-
tionsarebetweentwomanagers.Changingtheinteractiontooperatebetweentwomanagers
does not alter the sense or validity of our Framework, one is hierarchically different to the
other.
We consider the Financial Manager ﬁrst, as he is the person who will have to change his
job and facilitate the work of the Health Centre Manager. In our previous paper we called
his initial position with the Health Centre Manager, Sole Participation, as he would be
participating with the Health Centre Manager but making the decisions (Purdy and Gago,
2003).
Using our constructions of the legal and institutional material, we anticipate that the
Financial Manager will start in the position of having responsibility for particular activities
at the Health Centre, the daily activities. Our earlier discussion of the Financial Manager’s
role indicated he appeared to be in a position of autonomy over the daily activities of a
Health Centre. He was taking autonomous decisions.
For us, the word Autonomy means that, a person is able to act and take a decision alone
without ﬁrst referring to or conferring with another, at the time when the decision is taken.
The person exercising Autonomy may have referred to and conferred with others before the
time when the decision was taken, and so be aware of the views of these others. In using
the word Autonomy we consider the person to have taken the decision in the context of the
organization, so that this does not mean that the person has personal freedom to act, but
organizational freedom to act.
Autonomy did not appear in our earlier Framework. Autonomy is similar to, and might
even be argued to be a form of Participation. It might also be argued to be a form of
21Fig. 5. Anticipations about an inﬂuence construct including autonomy.
Consultation. Here we considered Autonomy in the Galician context of regionalisation.
Successive Spanish government’s messages indicated that the regions would determine
their own futures and so we have placed it on our inﬂuence construct beyond Participation.
We have chosen to use Autonomy in place of the Sole Participation label that we used in
the previous paper, and consider that the Health Centre Manager will develop to work at the
Health Centre with similar/same Autonomy to the Financial Manager. These anticipations
about an inﬂuence construct and autonomy are shown in Fig. 5.
After using the legal and institutional material we now have a different Matrix of Infor-
mation and Inﬂuence. We have amended the Inﬂuence construct to deal with the concept of
Autonomy but at this stage Information has not still been amended. The Anticipated Interim
Matrix is shown in Fig. 6.
6.2. Inﬂuence—Financial Manager
Overaperiodoftime,itisanticipatedthattheFinancialManagerwillmovefromAuton-
omy using Local Health Centre Information, through Participation and then subsequently
have less inﬂuence upon the Health Centre’s daily activities as the Health Centre Manager
does his job.
It is anticipated that the effect of these changes will alter the Framework of Issues on the
Personal Information Inﬂuence Matrix of the Financial Manager. The Framework of Issues
and the movement on the Financial Manager’s Matrix will be as follows:
1. Starts in the Local Information–Autonomy box.
2. After a period of time will interact with the Health Centre Manager and will be located
in the Local Information–Participation box.
3. After a short period of time will interact with the Health Centre Manager and so will
then be located in the Local Information–Consultation box.
Fig. 6. Anticipated Interim Matrix Incorporating Autonomy.
22Fig. 7. Anticipated movements of the Financial Manager in the Autonomy Matrix in relation to the Health Centre
Manager.
4. After a further period of interaction will be located in the Local Information–
Communication box.
5. After a further period of interaction will be located in the Local Different Information–
Communication box.
Currently, we do not know how this local different information is to be regarded.
The anticipated movements of these changes in items 1–4 are shown in Fig. 7.
WhentheHealthCentreManagerachievesautonomytherewouldbeachangedrelation-
ship between the managers and the Health Centre Manager reporting on Local Different
Information to the Financial Manager. The changed relationship indicates a different
Information–Inﬂuence Matrix for the Financial Manager with the Health Centre Manager.
The Financial Manager would receive the local different information, item 5, from the
Health Centre Manager, and this is demonstrated in Fig. 8.
6.3. Inﬂuence—Health Centre Manager
TheHealthCentreManager’sjobistogainAutonomytobeabletorunthedailyactivities
of the Health Centre. The extent to which this Autonomy occurs will relate to the Financial
Fig. 8. Anticipated position of the Financial Manager after Health Centre Manager achieves autonomy.
23Manager and his requirements. It is anticipated that the Health Centre Manager will start
without knowledge, information and inﬂuence but will acquire these and have Autonomy
to run the Health Centre’s daily activities. It is also anticipated that the Health Centre
Manager will obtain the necessary requirements from the Financial Manager or other forms
of training.
Again, it is not possible to specify precisely how these matters will occur, but the Health
Centre Manager will acquire various parts of Local Information and combine these with
differentformsofinﬂuence,asagreedwiththeFinancialManager,untilapointofAutonomy
is reached. When the Health Centre Manager is involved with running the Health Centre, it
seems likely that the Health Centre Manager will then become a source of information for
the Financial Manager about the Health Centre. Of course, this might occur at any stage,
for as soon as a different person becomes involved with the Health Centre the Financial
Manager’s perceptions about the Health Centre could change through the views of others.
We do not have clear anticipations to create a framework for the types of information that
will be created from the resulting situation.
In summary, we anticipate that the effect of these changes will alter the Framework of
Issues on the Personal Information Inﬂuence Matrix of the Health Centre Manager. The
Framework of Issues and the movement on the Health Centre Manager’s Matrix will be as
follows:
1. Starts in the No Information–No Inﬂuence box.
2. After a short period of time will interact with the Financial Manager and so will then be





5. After a period of time will be located in the Local Information–Autonomy box.
The anticipated movements of these changes, for the Health Centre Manager on the
Autonomy Matrix, are shown in Fig. 9.




not clariﬁed or deﬁned as we do not know, and cannot anticipate, what types of information
will be available in relation to the Health Centre.
Analysis of the Galician legislation has indicated a number of areas where matters could
affect the context of working for the Financial Manager and a Health Centre Manager,
and hence affect the research Framework. These matters include the involvement of the
community in the determination of the activities of the Centre. The changes are expected
to occur within the setting of a Health Centre, along with concerns about how this can be
achieved without time and money. The changes in the remuneration of some professionals,
the challenges of the notion of people working with retos and how information can be
devised to examine the outcomes of a retos for an individual.
We have no idea what types of retos will be used with the Financial Manager and the
Health Centre Manager. However, the legislation indicates that objectives will be set and
reported upon, therefore, we can anticipate that some of the notions about the retos will be
in the form of information. If this is the situation, then this information can be used with an
appropriate Information–Inﬂuence Matrix.
Our Initial Galician Framework Matrix (Purdy and Gago, 2003) uses the notion of
information which is used at various distances of decisions from the person who is being
askedforaview.Itisanticipatedthatinformation,concerningdailyHealthCentreactivities,
will be known by the Financial Manager. Further, this information would be regarded as
at the level of the Health Centre and in our terminology, Local Information. Currently, for
the purposes of the Information–Inﬂuence Matrix, these types of information cannot be
anticipatedbyus.ThismeansthattheAnticipatedInterimMatrixIncorporatingAutonomy,
Fig. 6, is our ﬁnal position for individuals.
7. Organizational and institutional level of analysis
7.1. Introduction
This far, the paper has been concerned with analysing accounting information and inﬂu-
ence at the individual level, since this is the subject of one of our interests, approaches and
methodologies. It has made more ﬁne and accurate our anticipations about an individual
Financial Manager interacting with a Health Centre Manager (Purdy and Gago, 2003). The
amendments to our previous Frameworks followed from our consideration and interpreta-
tion of the Galician legal pronouncements about the proposed changes.
Although our anticipations have been made more speciﬁc, as the sections commenting
on the Galician context indicated, these legalities have been unclear in a number of areas.
Thismeansthat,theoveralloutcomeswilldependupontheoverallGalicianand/ornational
policies that are pursued whilst the managers take part in the proposed changes.
These overall policies are at an institutional/organizational level and clearly will affect
the individuals in their work. We anticipated that some of the individuals involved
25could encounter difﬁculties such as the continuation of service levels whilst imple-
menting changes, the ﬁnancing of these levels and management changes, including
any retos.
Our previous literature has emphasized the individuals involved and that managers will
have their own individual approaches to handling accounting data and inﬂuence (Purdy
and Gago, 2003). At the same time some of this literature has recognized that indus-
trial and organizational relationships will be involved. In fact the conceptualization of the
Information–Inﬂuence Matrix was based on social construction rather than personal con-
struction (Purdy and Gago, 2003). This section will demonstrate our thinking about matters
at this institutional/organizational level, in terms of our approaches. This will allow us to
analyse some of the institutional/organizational arrangements from our empirical data with
our Frameworks and methods of analysis.
7.2. Previous literature
The approach to individuals involved in their organization has been to consider the
notions about activities that have been available to them. An early commonly found notion
was inﬂuence. Using the notion of inﬂuence it was possible to label some of the circum-
stances relating to an employee (Purdy and Gago, 2003).
These levels of inﬂuence formed a continuum of different constructs. For example, it
was accepted that an employee might perceive their organizational position to be that of No
Inﬂuence. That is to say the employee perceived he could not exercise any inﬂuence. This
was considered the position of least inﬂuence for an employee, but there were other labels,
Communication, Consultation and Participation (Purdy and Gago, 2003). These have been
deﬁned earlier in the paper, along with the lack of a position of total inﬂuence, and for
brevity are not repeated here.
Itwasacceptedthatthepreciseconstructaboutinﬂuencewouldvarywitheachindividual,
sinceeachindividualwasdifferentintermsofpersonalconstructpsychology(Kelly,1955).
This meant that with inﬂuence, each individual would have their own personal views at any
point on this continuum or construct. Each would have their own views for each label.
Personal construct psychology considers there is commonality of construing about an issue
(Kelly, 1955) and one place where this is likely to occur is in the context of an organization.
Theliteratureconsideredtheindividualinanorganizationcontext,becauseresearchwas
being conducted with individuals in organizations. Consequently, amongst other matters,
the ethos, the attitude in the organization or part of the organization, towards how inﬂuence
is exercised in the organization, or a part of the organization, helps to determine how
employees are dealt with and what forms of inﬂuence they work with. This means that it
would be possible to have constructs about how inﬂuence is exercised by the organization’s
ethos, but this would also depend upon the individual managers working with inﬂuence
(Purdy and Gago, 2003).
The earlier parts of the paper have dealt with managers, but here we can use the
same/similar construct of inﬂuence to apply to that of the organization and use the
same/similar words for this. Of course, with personal construct psychology, it is antici-
pated that there could be different organizational views about the organization’s position,
depending upon those involved.
26Fig. 10. Anticipated change of the Health Centre Organization on the Autonomy Matrix.
Turning to accounting data, a similar set of constructs can exist at the level of an organi-
zationorpartofanorganization,ashavebeenusedwithindividuals.Thus,thecontinuumof
data in any organizational situation could be related to the label of No Information, where
the organization does not formally provide data in the situation under consideration. At
the same time, it is possible to consider an organization having other constructs about the
provision of accounting data. The other labels of accounting data are Local Information,
Medium Information and Distant Information. These also have been deﬁned earlier in the
paper, along with the lack of a position of total information and are not repeated here.
Inasimilarmanner,theexactcontentofanyoftheselabelsofinformationprovisionwill
depend on the organization and the person describing the situation. An earlier empirical
study used the accounts and reports from companies newly ﬂoated on the London Stock
Exchange.Thesedocumentsprovidedevidenceofeachcompany’sstateduseofaccounting
data with employees in their company. The study was able to demonstrate the differences,
in Information and Inﬂuence for the employees, amongst those companies with respect to
types of accounting data and the different organizational inﬂuence forms used.
Here the constructs of Information and Inﬂuence are brought together in an Organiza-
tion Information–Inﬂuence Matrix, and is shown in Fig. 10. Fig. 10 shows the anticipated
outcomes of the Galician legislation and its written policy of an organization which is in the
position of providing Local Information in a Communication position, but intends to move
toanAutonomyinﬂuencepositionandLocalInformation.TheMatrixstartswiththeHealth
Centre Organization at the Local Information–Communication position and indicates the
Health Centre’s Organization is anticipated to move right towards the Autonomy position.
In doing this it moves through Local Information and Consultation, then Local Information
and Participation and ﬁnally Local Information and Autonomy. These four stages are the
Framework of Organization Issues for the Health Centres.
8. Summary and conclusions
The authors have used the original literatures to analyse Galician legislation about pro-
posedchangesinhealthcarewithGalicianHealthCentres.Thepaperhasamendedanearlier
27Framework to make it more speciﬁc to individual Galician managers. This has been com-
pleted in terms of Developed Frameworks for a Financial Manager and a Health Centre
Manager working to produce change in Galician healthcare.
The ﬁnal section of the paper has moved the level of analysis to the organizational/
institutional. This has used similar/the same notions applied with individuals to apply with
theorganizationchangesthathavebeenanticipated.IthasproducedaDevelopedFramework
of Organization Issues for Galician Health Centres.
Both sets of theoretical Developed Frameworks are sufﬁcient for us to analyse empirical
data collected from Galician managers involved in changes to Health Centre healthcare.
We have argued our position of acceptance of the legal anticipations and why at this
point we have made the amendments to our Framework in the ways we have to reﬂect this.
This is our current position but we are aware that similar moves towards changes in the
provisionofmoreinformationandmoreinﬂuencetoemployeeselsewherehavenotoccurred
smoothly.
We have shown evidence from the UK, the European Community and the US that indi-
cates proposals for changes have been introduced and accompanied by strong narratives
about more information provision to employees and more employee involvement. The pro-
cesses have been different, some changes did not take place, or had been altered either
before, during or after introduction. The general outcomes have been similar in that change
was more likely to be more favourable for managers than for non-management employees.
The paper contains our dynamic Framework and is only a part of a very complex area of
anticipated events. We have chosen these research approaches and these dynamic Frame-
works are our personal constructions. Others are quite free to offer other approaches or
indeed construe the relevance of the legal background in a different manner to us and the
current Framework.
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